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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LLOYD D. COLEY,

]
No.

Plaintiff/Appellant,

900446-CA

vs.
NANCY P. COLEY,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
The Jurisdiction Section of "Brief of Appellant" (p. 4) is
defective for the following reasons:
1.

Utah Code Annotated §77-35-26 (2)(a) and (b) is part of

the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure; this is a civil matter.
2.

Utah Code Annotated §77-35-26 was repealed in 1989.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an Order, on an Order to Show Cause
dated, July 13, 1990 (Record at 268-271). Plaintiff filed a Notice
of Appeal (Record at 316).

On October 10, 1990 the Court of

Appeals vacated and remanded the Order to the district court for
further findings of fact with respect to the restriction of

Plaintiff's visitation with the parties7 minor daughter.
at 332-333).

(Record

The Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction to review

any amended order of the district court.

An Amended Order was

entered on January 9, 1991.
Plaintiff

is also appealing

(See "Supplemental Brief of

Appellant") a final Order, August 7, 1990, of Judge Michael Murphy1
denying Plaintiff's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice.

(Record at

314-315).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
filing a

"Verified Motion

Defendant instituted this action by
for Order to Show Cause" against

Plaintiff on or about February 21, 1990 (Record at 213). In the
"Verified Motion" Defendant alleged:
a)

That numerous judgments had been entered against

Plaintiff for failure to pay child support.2

(Record at

213).

Presiding Judge of the Third Judicial District Court.
2

At the time of the "Verified Motion", the Plaintiff had not
made any payment of child support since November or December, 1988
and was over $27,000.00 in arrears.
2

b)

That Plaintiff had been held in contempt of court

and had served 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail for
his contempt.3
c)

(Record at 214).

That Plaintiff still demanded his visitation rights

with the parties' minor daughter after his release from
jail.
d)

(Record at 214).

That the trial court should again sentence Plaintiff

to serve time in the Salt Lake County Jail for his
continued failure to pay child support and his continued
contempt of court.
e)

(Record at 214).

That the trial court should suspend Plaintiff's

visitation rights with the parties' minor daughter for
his continued contempt of court.

(Record at 214).

Disposition in the Lower Court.

A hearing was held on

Defendant's Order to Show Cause on June 18, 1990 in the Third
District Court.

Evidence was proffered by counsel for Defendant

and Plaintiff was called to testify.

Judge James S. Sawaya found

that Plaintiff was in contempt and ordered Plaintiff's visitation
terminated until further order of the court and sentenced Plaintiff
to serve thirty (30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail# however,
the jail sentence was suspended.

On or about November, 1989.
3

(Record at 262). An Order was

signed by Judge Sawaya on July 13, 1990, (Record 268-271), and an
Amended Order was entered by Judge Sawaya on January 9, 1991.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Plaintiff's "Statement of Case" (p. 6 of Brief of

Appellant),

consists

of

approximately

34

paragraphs

that,

collectively, are somewhat true but are generally misleading and
slanted according to Plaintiff's pro-se and non-lawyer approach to
his own case.

Rather than challenge the truth and veracity of

Plaintiff's representations of fact, Defendant elects to set forth
her own version of the pertinent facts as follows.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on September 8,

1982 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

(Decree, Record at 12-14).

Plaintiff was ordered to pay

child support in the amount of $250.00 per month for the parties'
minor child until said child reached age 21.
3.

(Record at 13).

Since the entry of the Decree, Defendant has brought

numerous motions for orders to show cause against Plaintiff for
child support arrearages, payment of medical expenses, for the
timely payment of child support, etc..4
4

November 17, 1982, judgment entered in the amount of
$1,750.00. (Record at 24-25).
February 7, 1984, judgment entered in the amount of
$1,880.14. (Record at 53-55, 65-67)
4

4.

On December 3, 1988, an evidentiary hearing was held

before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court, on the
issue of Plaintiff's contempt of court for failing to pay court
ordered child support.
5.

On December 16, 1988, an Order was entered finding

Plaintiff in contempt of court and sentencing Plaintiff to thirty
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail. Imposition of the sentence
was reserved for sixty (60) days to give Plaintiff time to purge
himself of the contempt.
6.

(Record at 188-193).

On January 24, 1989, Plaintiff, having failed to purge

the contempt, was ordered (in court) to surrender himself to the
Salt Lake County Jail on January 27, 1989 for a period of thirty
(30) days.
7.

(Record at 212).

On January 27, 1989, Plaintiff failed to report at the

jail as ordered.

April 22, 1986, judgment entered in the amount of
$5,471.00, combining all previous judgments. (Record at 95-99)
October 27, 1988, judgment entered in the amount of
$10,001.24. (Record at 173-177)
July 13, 1990, judgment entered in the amount of
$27,365.76 combining all previous judgments plus interest. (Record
at 268-271)
5

8.

On February 6, 1989 a bench warrant was issued against

Plaintiff after he failed to appear on January 27, 1989 as ordered.
(Record at 211).
9.

Plaintiff left the State of Utah for several months

(Hearing Transcript, June 18, 1990, pg. 10-12, 15-21) and upon his
return to Utah he was arrested and served his jail sentence during
November, 1989.
10.

On February 21, 1990, Defendant filed a Verified Motion

for Order to Show Cause, (Record at 213-215), requesting judgment
for child support arrearages, for Plaintiff to be sentenced to jail
for continued contempt and for Plaintiff's visitation with the
parties' minor child to be suspended.

On May 7, 1990, Defendant

filed an Affidavit in Support of said Motion. (Record at 222-233).
11.

On June 18, 1990, Defendant's Order to Show Cause was

heard by Judge Sawaya.

Plaintiff

testimony was proffered by counsel.

testifietd and

Defendant's

Based upon the evidence

presented, Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in continuing contempt of
court and ordered Plaintiff to serve thirty (30) days in jail and
suspended Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child.
(Record at 262).

6

12.

On July 13, 1990, an Order was entered against Plaintiff

for child support arrearages5, for continued contempt of court, and
suspending Plaintiff's visitation with the parties' minor child.
(Record at 268-271).
13.

On July 16, 1990, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Bias

or Prejudice (Record at 272-284) and on July 20, 1990 Plaintiff
filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice (Record at 299304).
14.

On August 1, 1990, Judge Sawaya entered a Minute Entry

stating "the Court having reviewed the Affidavit of * Bias or
Prejudice

in

the

above

entitled

matter

and

questions

its

sufficiency and orders the same referred to Judge Murphy for his
determination."
15.

(Record at 313).

On August 1, 1990, Judge Michael R. Murphy entered an

Order stating Plaintiff's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice lacked
legal sufficiency and that Judge Sawaya would remain assigned to
the case.
16.

(Record at 314-315).
On August 13, 1990 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal of

the July 13, 1990 Order of Judge Sawaya and the August 7, 1990
Order of Judge Murphy.
17.

(Record at 316).

On October 10, 1990, this Court vacated the July 13, 1990

Order denying Plaintiff contact with the parties' minor child and
5

Judgment was entered for $27,365.76.
7

temporarily remanded to the district court for additional findings
on the issue of the best interest of the child.
retained jurisdiction to review any new orders.

This Court

(Record at 332-

333).
18.

On December 11, 1990, Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law were signed by Judge Sawaya pertaining to the July 13, 1990
Order.
19.

On January 9, 1991 an Amended Order6 was entered by Judge

Sawaya in accordance with the Findings and Conclusions of December
11, 1990.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Amended Order7 signed by Judge Sawaya does not violate the
First, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution as argued by Plaintiff.
Judge Sawaya found that Plaintiff's non-payment of child
support was willful and contumacious and that it was in the best
interest of the minor child not to have visitation with Plaintiff.
The district court did not err in conditioning the restoration
of visitation rights upon compliance with support orders.

Amending the June 18, 1990 Order on Order to Show Cause.
7

January 9, 1991.
8

U.C.A. §78-32-10 does not prevent the district court from
restricting visitation privileges, if the court finds that the
restriction is in the best interests of the child.
An order to show cause proceeding is proper for the purpose
of suspending and/or terminating Plaintiff's visitation.
The district court can sign an order even though objections
have been filed if the district court finds the objections have no
merit.
Plaintiff fails to support his contention that Judge Sawaya
is biased.
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.

9

ARGUMENT
1.

THE ORDER SIGNED BY JUDGE SAWAYA DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FIRST, EIGHTH, OR FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AS ARGUED BY PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff states in his Brief

(p. 13) that "there is a

constitutional right of a parent to maintain a personal and close
relationship with their [sic] children" and cites to several cases
to support his position.

(Interest of Walter B., 577 P. 2d 119

(Utah 1978); Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625,
626, L.Ed. 1042 (1923); and In Re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
All of these cases involve the termination of parental rights.
Plaintiff's reliance on these cases is flawed for two reasons:
first, the cases are limited in scope to permanent termination of
parental rights while case at hand is far more limited in that
Judge Sawaya merely suspended Plaintiff's visitation until he
exhibits behavior consistent with the best

interests of his

daughter; and, second, the cases are cited out-of-context of the
law governing suspending of visitation rights because there are
numerous cases that empower a court to restrict

or suspend

visitation rights under certain fact situations.
Termination of parental rights means the permanent elimination
of all parental rights and duties, by court order. (See, Utah Code
Ann., §78-3a-2(14).

In the present case, Judge Sawaya did not

permanently eliminate the Plaintiff's parental rights or his
10

visitation. The Judge merely suspended the Plaintiff's visitation
until he responsibly responds to the needs of his daughter.
Plaintiff errs in trying to insert into this case legal authorities
which pertain to permanent parental-right deprivation situations.
This case is not about permanently terminating Plaintiff's
parental rights; it is about a parent's responsibility to help his
ex-wife raise their child.

Plaintiff may think that because his

ex-wife has a home and employment —

and because his daughter gets

fed, clothed and cared for without assistance from him — that this
is just a case of legal semantics where he can play lawyer and
appeal his case8 and spend countless hours trying to legally
justify why he does not financially support his daughter. However,
this is a case where, as Judge Sawaya found, Plaintiff's failure
to pay child support is willful and contumacious. It does not take
a legal scholar to rightly conclude that a man who willfully
refuses to support his child does not have her best interest at
heart or in mind.
On February 8, 1989 Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of
Prohibition against Judge Sawaya in this Court. On July 28, 1989
this Court determined that the Petition was frivolous and therefore
denied the same. On August, 1990 Plaintiff filed a Notice of
Appeal in the matter at hand. Since the filing of the Notice,
Plaintiff has filed several motions and this matter was heard by
this Court back in October, 1990. Plaintiff has continued with the
matter since that time and has filed several more motions and has
even filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme
Court with respect to the Order of this Court denying Plaintiff's
Motion to Stay.
11

Plaintiff next argues that the Amended Order violates the
Eighth

Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution

as

it

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. There are several cases
in which visitation has been suspended or conditioned and Defendant
will cite those cases below.

Plaintiff's only support for his

argument that suspension of visitation amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment is his own subjective belief that it does.
The credibility of Plaintiff's statement, that the Amended
Order destroys a loving relationship, is undermined by the fact
that Plaintiff, of his own accord, willfully refuses to financially
support his child and he physically abandoned her between February,
1989 until after November, 1989.9
Plaintiff further contends that the Amended Order violates the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by denying
him due process. Plaintiff has had more than ample opportunity to
show Judge Sawaya, as supported by the entire record, that he
genuinely loves and cares for his daughter in not only word but,
as important, in deed.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Amended Order violates his
First Amendment rights of free speech. The district court did not
rule that Plaintiff could not possess the attitudes and beliefs he
portrays, or that he could not express them in public places. The
9

See Defendant's Statement of Facts #7.
12

district court simply ruled that it was not in the best interest
of the minor child to be exposed to Plaintiff's anti-social
attitudes and beliefs through contact with him. The district court
is not punishing Plaintiff for his beliefs but is only trying to
impress upon Plaintiff his proper behavior and responsibility to
his

daughter.

Specifically,

Plaintiff

has

a

parental

responsibility to bring up his daughter to be the best citizen
possible.
Therefore, nothing in the Amended Order contradicts the
Constitution of the United States and it does not in any manner
violate Plaintiff's rights.

2.

JUDGE SAWAYA FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF ' S NON-PAYMENT
OF CHILD SUPPORT WAS WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS
AND THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD NOT TO HAVE VISITATION
WITH PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Sawaya suspended his visitation
for the sole reason that Plaintiff is willfully not paying his
court-ordered child support. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Amended Order clearly takes into consideration the best

13

interest of the child as required under Rohr vs. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382
(Utah 1985 ). 10
The Lunsford, Slade, West, Soderburg, Smith, and Dana cases,
cited by Plaintiff, are erroneously utilized by Plaintiff; the
portions of those cases that he refers to are taken out of context.
In Lunsf ord vs. Waldrip, 493 P. 2d 789 at 792 (Wash. App.
1972), the Washington Court of Appeals stated:
The paramount concern in such matters
[suspending visitation] is the welfare of the
child, and the conduct of the father as it
affects the child's welfare is a proper
consideration for the trial court.
How can it be in the best interest of any child to be raised by a
parent who refuses, unless faced with jail or suspension of
visitation, to pay any support to help provide food, clothing,
shelter, etc. for that child?

In the present case, the district

court found that Plaintiff was educated, healthy and able to
provide the ordered support and that Plaintiff had not given the
district court any reason whatsoever as to why Plaintiff had not
paid the support as ordered.
Slade vs. Slade, 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979), was an action by
a father to establish visitation rights with his child who was born

... where the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay child
support is contumacious, or willful and intentional, and not due
to inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or denied,
if the welfare of the child so requires. Rohr (p.383).
14

out of wedlock and the Utah Supreme Court found that "visitation
is a matter addressed to the district court's sound discretion".
(Slade at 901).
In West vs. West, 487 P. 2d 96 (Or. App. 1971), the case
involved an order by the trial court conditioning the father's
visitation upon the father paying the court ordered child support.
The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that "the right of visitation
cannot be made dependent upon the payment of support for children
....".

However, the court upheld the trial court's order:
[T]he order was set for the purpose of
bringing home to the defendant a sense of
responsibility for the child. (West at 98)

Soderburg vs. Soderburg, 299 P.2d 479 (Idaho 1956), is a case
where the father petitioned the trial court for a restraining order
so that the children's mother could not transport the children out
of the court's jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's reliance on Smith vs. Smith, 135 Utah Adv. Rep.
33 (Utah App. 1990) is inappropriate because the language quoted
by Plaintiff refers to a situation where a party sought a change
in custody because the other party had interfered with visitation
rights.
Plaintiff's reliance on Dana vs. Dana, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 76
(Utah App. 1990) is similarly mistaken because the visitation issue
in that case focused on the mother's complaint that the father did
15

not exercise visitation and she wanted him to be ordered to comply
with the visitation schedule or be ordered to pay additional child
support to offset her babysitting expenses.
In Reardon vs. Reardonr 415 P.2d 571 at 574 (Ariz. App. 1966)
the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:
The denial of [sic] right of visitation
conditioned upon payment of support monies is
based on the premise that the primary
beneficiaries of support payments are the
children and that the court may balance the
equities by requiring the husband to make the
payments for the benefit of the children
before visitation is allowed, against allowing
the father to visit the children regardless of
whether the father cares enough to provide
adequate support for his children or not.
We are not persuaded there was error in
requiring the father to keep up his payments
of $25 per month, as a condition to his seeing
them and having temporary custody once a week.
This is not to be construed as a bartering of
justice, but rather a holding that to this
extent the father must perform the duty to
support his children, if he expects the
pleasure of their companionship. The court
holds out an inducement to perform <i father's
duty. Since the court retains full control
over this matter, so as to suit orders to
conditions that may arise, ....
In the case at hand, The Plaintiff has failed to provide
support for his daughter for several years except when faced with
jail.

The only actions which have prompted payments by Plaintiff

have been jail sentences, yet after serving the first jail
sentence, Plaintiff still made no child support payments until
16

faced with a second jail sentence.

In suspending Plaintiff's

visitation for a period of time, Judge Sawaya is trying to help
Plaintiff

realize

and

understand

that he

(Plaintiff) has a

responsibility to support his daughter.
Therefore, the Amended Order did not suspend Plaintiff's
visitation for the sole reason of non-payment of support.
At this point, a review of Rohr is appropriate. The facts in
Rohr and the facts in the present case are compared as follows:
1.

Amount of Father's Child-Support Arrearage. At the

time the issue of suspending visitation came before the
district court, the amount of the father's child-support
delinquency was:

2.

a.

In Rohr:

$2,400.

Id. at 383.

b.

In Coley: $27,305.00

(Amended Order).

Number of Child-Support Judgments Against Father.

At the time the issue of suspending visitation came
before

the

district

court,

the

court

had

entered

judgments for child support against the father:

3.

a.

In Rohr:

Not apparent from case test.

b.

In Coley: 4 previous times.

(Record at 223).

Conditions on Restoration of Visitation.

At the

time the issue of suspending visitation came before the

17

district

court,

the

district

court

conditioned

restoration of visitation upon:
a.

In Rohr:
of

Payment of all arrearages

alimony,

child

support,

attorney7s fees and costs, at which
time the court would determine what
visitation

would

be

appropriate.

Id. at 383.
b.

In Coley: Payment of $450 per month
for

4

consecutive

months

(i.e.

ongoing support of $250 per month
and payment of $200 per month toward
the arrearage judgment of $27,305.00
which

was

accruing

interest

of

$273.05 per month at the rate of 12%
per annum post-judgment interest.)
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

then

held

that

the

following

principles of law applied to the Rohr facts:
1.

"A court may not deny the noncustodial parent

visitation rights for the mere failure to pay child
support, where the failure to pay is due to an inability
to pay."

In the present case, Judge Sawaya found that

Plaintiff had the ability to earn incomei (Findings of
18

Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Amended Order on Order
to Show Cause) and that Plaintiff's failure to pay was
willful

and

contumacious

(Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law Re: Amended Order on Order to Show
Cause).
2.

"[W]here the noncustodial parent's refusal to pay

child support is willful and intentional, and not due to
inability to pay, visitation rights may be reduced or
denied, if the welfare of the child so requires" and "the
conduct of the father [sic] as it affects the child's
welfare is a proper consideration of the trial court."
In the present case, Judge Sawaya made the following
findings with respect to the requirement "if the welfare
of the child so requires" and as to "the conduct of the
father as it affects the child's welfare":
a.

Plaintiff does not respect the legal
system. (Findings of Fact #12).

b.

Plaintiff's attitudes and behaviors
are anti-social

and constitute a

substantial deviation from the moral
norms of society.

(Findings of Fact

#12).

19

c.

Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes
are not a proper example for his
child. (Findings of Fact #12).

d.

Plaintiff
child's

lacks

concern

financial

for

the

welfare.

(Conclusions of Law).
Plaintiff's

visitation

was

suspended

to

impress

upon

Plaintiff a sense of responsibility for the welfare of his child,
and the district court found that until Plciintiff felt such a
responsibility it was not in the daughter's best interest to have
visitation with Plaintiff.

3.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONDITIONING
THE RESTORATION OF VISITATION RIGHTS UPON
COMPLIANCE WITH SUPPORT ORDERS.

The Plaintiff seems to argue that Rohr prohibited Judge Sawaya
from conditioning the restoration of visitation rights upon payment
of child support.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 21-22).

The quotation that Plaintiff inserts from Rohr does not
support his contention. The language Plaintiff quotes referred to
the Rohr trial court requiring payment of all back alimony, child
support, attorney's fees and costs before the trial court would
consider a modification of the divorce decree.
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In the present case, the Amended Order does not in any way
restrict

Plaintiff

from

petitioning

the

trial

court

for

a

modification of the divorce decree and it does not require payment
of all back child support, interest and attorney fees prior to
restoration of visitation.

The Amended Order provides Plaintiff

with a means of restoring his visitation.

Rohr did not prohibit

Judge Sawaya from requiring Plaintiff to pay his ongoing child
support of $250 per month and $200 per month toward the judgment
of $27,305.00.

n

The purpose of Judge Sawaya's ruling was to

convert Plaintiff from a willful non-payer of support to a willful
payer of support.

The Judge's experience with Plaintiff —

is clear from the record —

which

was that Plaintiff did not pay child

support and his failure to pay was willful. When found in contempt
of court in 1989 for not paying child support, Plaintiff still did
not pay.

The first time he paid support, following the 1989

hearings, was on the eve of going to jail, and then he did not pay
the amount required to not go to jail.

After serving the jail

sentence, Plaintiff still did not pay until he was again brought
before Judge Sawaya in 1990 and faced with the prospect of going
to jail and losing his visitation.

At that time, Plaintiff was

again found in contempt of court and sentenced to jail, but Judge

Post-judgment interest at 12% per annum was accruing on
that judgment in the amount of approximately $273.05 per month.
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Sawaya gave Plaintiff two payment options: $150 a week to stay out
of jail or $450 a month for four consecutive months to stay out of
jail and to have his visitation restored.

Plaintiff has elected

the first option and has ignored the second option.

With respect

to the first option, Plaintiff has seldom paid on a weekly basis.
Judge Sawaya's obvious intent was to help Plaintiff get used to
paying a small amount of $50 per week on a regular basis.

Rather

than paying weekly, however, Plaintiff has paid a day or two in
advance of regularly-scheduled contempt-review hearings. A day or
two before each such hearing, Plaintiff will pay most of what was
owed since the previous such hearing, but when he does so he is
usually about $100 short of what should have been paid (assuming
he had paid $50 per week).12

Nevertheless, the partial payment

usually satisfies Judge Sawaya enough so that he continues to stay
imposition of the contempt jail sentence.
Review of the record will reveal that Judge Sawaya was
basically faced with this dilemma:
Defendant has brought her ex-husband to court a
number of times and obtained judgments;
Plaintiff is well-educated, lives reasonably well,
has income, and eats well and his failure to pay child
support is willful;
The Defendants' judgments against Plaintiff have run
up to $27,305.00;
12

See "Schedule of Payments" attached hereto.
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Accrual of interest on the judgments doesn/t prompt
payments by Plaintiff;
Assessment of attorney
doesn't prompt payments;

fees

against

Plaintiff

Imposition of a jail sentence prompted a few hundred
dollars in payments but as soon as Plaintiff was out of
jail he didn't make any more payments until faced with
the prospect of a second jail sentence;
If Plaintiff would work as hard at gainful
employment as he works in trying to avoid judgments and
contempt orders, he'd probably be able to support his
daughter quite well;
Plaintiff works awfully hard at trying to avoid
paying support, and I don't think that type of behavior
and attitude is a socially-responsible or healthy
attitude for his daughter to be subjected to directly or
indirectly;
So what do I do to turn Plaintiff into a childsupport paying parent?
Given the foregoing, Judge Sawaya exercised proper judicial
discretion in fashioning a contempt order designed to impress upon
Plaintiff his responsibility to financially support his daughter,
and an order that would allow him to get on with his visitation
schedule in a matter of four short months.
Finally, this appellate court stated in its October 10, 1990
decision, that there needed to be some type of program by which
Plaintiff's visitation rights could be restored unto him.
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4.

U.C.A §78-32-10 DOES NOT PREVENT THE DISTRICT
COURT FROM RESTRICTING A PARENT'S VISITATION
PRIVILEGES IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
RESTRICTION IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD.

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in using its
contempt power to suspend Plaintiff's visitation rights.
Judge Sawaya found Plaintiff in contempt for failing to pay
the court ordered child support and sentenced Plaintiff to thirty
(30) days in the Salt Lake County Jail.

That sentence was

suspended with the condition that Plaintiff make $50.00 per week
installment payments.
Plaintiff's visitation rights were also suspended because the
trial court found it was not in the best interest of the child to
have visitation with her father at this time.

Plaintiff's

visitation was also suspended based on the trial court believing,
based on the history of the case, that it would take more than a
jail sentence to bring home to Plaintiff a sense of responsibility
for the welfare of his child.
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Reardon at 574 stated:
Support payments, however, are provided for
the benefit of the minor children and when
considering the history of the matter, the age
of the children, the past conduct of the noncustodial parent in exercising rights of
visitation, and the possible ineffectiveness
of the court contempt power, the trial court
could properly find that the children will
benefit by conditioning visitation privileges
upon payment of support (emphasis added).

In the case at hand, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty (30)
days in the Salt Lake County Jail in early 1989 and served that
sentence in approximately November of 1989.

Between that time

(November, 1989) and the filing of Defendant's Order to Show Cause
in April 1990, Plaintiff made no efforts to pay ongoing child
support nor did he make any attempt to reduce the arrearages.
Judge Sawaya knowing this, not only found Plaintiff in contempt
again but, based on the history of the case and the nominal effect
the last jail term had on Plaintiff, also decided that further
measures were needed to bring home to Plaintiff

a sense of

responsibility for his daughter's welfare.
The Arizona Court in Reardon further stated:
Nothing we say herein should be construed by
parties litigant that they may assume the
burden upon themselves of denying rights of
visitation conditioned on payment of support
monies without a court order. This is a power
that the court only may have and it is basic
that the parties themselves do not have the
authority to so modify the orders of the
court. (Xd at 574).
Trial courts have the authority to suspend visitation. In the case
at hand, Judge Sawaya did not abuse any of the powers which have
been vested in him by the State of Utah.

Judge Sawaya was simply

fashioning an order to try and bring home to Plaintiff a sense of
responsibility for the welfare of his daughter —

knowing that if

he can convince Plaintiff that Plaintiff has that responsibility,
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and that if Plaintiff will perform that responsibility, the overall
long-term relationship between that father and child will be
enhanced and strengthened.

5.

AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PROCEEDING IS PROPER FOR
THE PURPOSE OF SUSPENDING AND/OR TERMINATING
PLAINTIFF'S VISITATION.

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in "denying
visitation" in the absence of a petition for modification.

The

trial court's power includes the power to suspend and/or terminate
Plaintiff's visitation rights without modifying the divorce decree.
The trial court can impose restrictions upon existing rights if the
trial court determines that such is necessctry to compel a party's
performance of an obligation.

Plaintiff's reliance on Rohr is

misplaced because, in that case, the wife petitioned to modify the
decree permanently. In the present case, Defendant's Order to Show
Cause was
visitation.

not

intended

to

permanently

deprive

Plaintiff

of

The intention of the Order to Show Cause, and the

resulting Amended Order, was to temporarily suspend Plaintiff's
visitation in order to impress upon him his responsibility for his
daughter's care, support and welfare, and the resulting Amended
Order gave Plaintiff an avenue whereby he could quickly re-instate
his decree-awarded visitation rights.
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6.

THE DISTRICT COURT CAN SIGN AN ORDER EVEN
THOUGH OBJECTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED IF THE
DISTRICT COURT FINDS THE OBJECTIONS HAVE NO
MERIT.

Nothing

in Rule 4-504(2)

of the Utah Code of Judicial

Administration, which is cited in Plaintiff's Brief, indicates that
even though objections to an order have been filed that the judge
cannot go ahead and sign the order over the objections.

The Rule

only states that a party must file their objections within five (5)
days after receiving the proposed order. Further, Plaintiff cites
no

evidence

that

Judge

Sawaya

failed

to

review

objections before signing the July 13, 1990 Order.

Plaintiff's

Assuming that

Plaintiff's objections were received by Judge Sawaya on July 11,
1990, as Plaintiff says, Judge Sawaya had three days, before he
signed the July 13, 1990 Order, to review Plaintiff's objections.
Furthermore, the July 13, 1990 Order was vacated and remanded.
At the November 26, 1990 hearing (regarding several motions filed
by

Plaintiff),

Judge

Sawaya

again

took

into

consideration

Plaintiff's objections to the proposed Amended Order before the
Judge decided to write his own Findings of Fact.

(November 26,

1990 Hearing Transcript pg. 14).
Plaintiff has failed to support his position that the trial
court erred by signing the Order over his objections.
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7.

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION THAT
JUDGE SAWAYA IS BIASED.

This section is in response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief
which is an appeal of the Order of Judge Michael R. Murphy, August
7, 1990, in which Judge Murphy found no legal sufficiency to remove
Judge Sawaya from this case.
Plaintiff states that Judge Sawaya is biased against him
because the Judge overruled his objections, denied his order to
show cause, etc..

Those types of actions by a judge do not

establish a condition of bias.

The judge's function is to take

evidence, weigh evidence, assess credibility, make findings of fact
and apply existing law to the facts of the case. Someone will win
and someone will lose, however that does not mean that the judge
was biased against the loser.
There is nothing in the record to support the Plaintiff's
allegations of bias.

8.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEAL.

Defendant does not believe that this appeal has been initiated
in good faith for the reason that Plaintiff has not presented a
plausible position.

Defendant can only conclude that Plaintiff's

motive has been to "wear down" Defendant's resolve and continue to
avoid having to pay child support.
28

If Plaintiff truly wanted to

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed in his Brief to provide any authority to
support his legal arguments.

Therefore, the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Amended Order to Judge Sawaya should be
upheld, and Defendant should be awarded her attorney fees and costs
incurred in this appeal.
Date:

May 23, 1991.

Randall J. Holmgren

continue his relationship with his daughter, he would use the time
and energy involved in this appeal and put it towards making an
effort to support his child and help provide for her.
Based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1988), Plaintiff should
be required to pay the attorney's fees and costs incurred by
Defendant in this appeal.

(See Burt vs. Burt, 145 Utah Adv. Rep.

29, 30 (Utah App. 1990); Hurt vs. Hurt, 793 P. 2d 948, 951 (Utah
App. 1990).
DATED this

< J<

- J

day of May/

1 9 9 1#

C
Randall J. Holmgren
Attorney for Appellee
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Section
78-3a-52.

Violation of order of court — Contempt
— Penalty.
78-3a-52.5. Minor held in detention — Credit for
good behavior.
78-3a-53.
Courtrooms, office space and equipment
— Maintenance costs of juvenile court.
78-3a-54.
Fines — Paid to state treasurer and rehabilitative employment program —
Witness costs and certification —
Court costs — Juvenile court fees.
78-3a-55.
Court records — Inspection — When fingerprints or photographs may be
taken — Expungement.
78-3a-56.
Expungement of juvenile court record —
Petition — Procedure.
78-3a-57.
Repealed.
78-3a-58.
Cooperation of political subdivisions and
public or private agencies and organizations.
78-3a-59.
Plan for obtaining health, mental health
and related services for juveniles —
Duty of administrator.
78-3a-60, 78-3a-61. Repealed.
78-3a-62.
Short title.
78-3a-63.
Abused or neglected child — Guardian
ad litem — Costs.
78-3a-64.
Abuse, neglect, or dependency of child —
Coordination of proceedings.
78-3a-65.
Treatment for offender and victim —
Costs.
78-3a-l.

J u v e n i l e court — P u r p o s e s — Jurisdiction.
The juvenile court is established as a forum for the
resolution of all matters properly brought before it,
consistent with applicable constitutional and statutory requirements of due process. The court has the
jurisdiction, powers, and duties under this chapter to:
(1) promote public safety and individual accountability by the imposition of appropriate
sanctions on persons who have committed acts in
violation of law;
(2) where appropriate, .order rehabilitation,
reeducation, and treatment for persons who have
committed acts bringing them within the court's
jurisdiction;
(3) adjudicate matters that relate to abused,
neglected, and dependent children and to provide
care and protection for these children by placement, protection, and custody orders;
(4) adjudicate matters that relate to children
who are beyond parental or adult control and to
establish appropriate authority over these children by means of placement and control orders;
(5) order appropriate measures to promote
guidance and control, preferably in the child's
own home, as an aid in the prevention of future
unlawful conduct and the development of responsible citizenship;
(6) remove a child from parental custody only
where the minor's safety or welfare, or the public
safety, may not otherwise be adequately safeguarded; and
(7) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to
act in the best interests of the children in all
cases and attempt to preserve and strengthen
family ties where possible.
1988
78-3a-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:

78-3a-2

(1) "Abused child" includes a child less than 18
years of age who has suffered or been threatened
with nonaccidental physical or mental harm,
negligent treatment, sexual exploitation, or been
the victim of a sexual offense as defined in the
Utah Criminal Code.
(2) "Adjudication" means a finding by the
court, incorporated in a decree, that the facts alleged in the petition have been proved.
(3) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or
over, except that persons 18 years or over under
the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court
pursuant to Section 78-3a-40 shall be referred to
as children.
(4) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Court
Judges.
(5) "Child" means a person less than 18 years
of age.
(6) "Child placement agency" means:
(a) a private agency licensed to receive
children for placement or adoption under
this code; or
(b) a private agency receiving children for
placement or adoption in another state,
which agency is licensed or approved where
such license or approval is required by law.
(7) "Commit" means to transfer legal custody.
(8) "Court" means the juvenile court or the district juvenile court, as the case may be.
(9) "Dependent child" includes a child who is
homeless or without proper care through no fault
of his parent, guardian, or custodian.
(10) "Deprivation of custody" means transfer
of legal custody by the court from a parent or the
parents or a previous legal custodian to another
person, agency, or institution.
(11) "Detention" means the temporary care of
children who require secure custody in physically
restricting facilities:
(a) pending court disposition or transfer to
another jurisdiction; or
(b) while under the continuing jurisdiction of the court.
(12) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means
psychological and social counseling of one or
more persons in the group, depending upon the
recommendation of the therapist.
(13) "Guardianship of the person" includes,
among other things, the authority to consent to
marriage, to enlistment in the armed forces, and
to consent to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment. "Guardianship of the person" includes legal custody, if legal custody is not vested
in another person, agency, or institution.
(14) "Legal custody" means a relationship embodying the following rights and duties:
(a) the right to physical custody of a child;
(b) the right and duty to protect, train,
and discipline him;
(c) the duty to provide him with food,
clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary
medical care;
(d) the right to determine where and with
whom he shall live; and
(e) the right, in an emergency, to authorize surgery or other extraordinary care.
(15) "Neglected child" includes a child:
(a) whose parent, guardian, or custodian
has abandoned him or has subjected him to
mistreatment or abuse;
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(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or
property damage or loss.
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski
area for the purpose of engaging in the sport of
skiing.
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a
ski area operator to be used for skiing.
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons,
and their agents, officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area.
1979
78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing —- Bar against
claim or recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in sport.
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier may make
any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent
risks of skiing.
1986
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail
boards listing inherent risks and limitations on liability.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or
more prominent locations within each ski area which
shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and
the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as
defined in this act.
1979
78-27-55.

Repealed.

1980

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action
or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees
or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1),
but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for
not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).
1988
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights
to recover attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon
any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or
other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
1986
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state
funded agency in action against state
or subdivision — Forfeit of appropriated monies.
Any agency or organization receiving state funds
which, as a result of its suing the state, or political
subdivision thereof, receives attorney's fees and costs
as all or part of a settlement or award, shall forfeit to
the General Fund, from its appropriated monies, an
amount equal to the attorney's fees received.
1981
78-27-58. Service of judicial process by persons
other than law enforcement officers.
Persons who are not peace officers, constables,
sheriffs, or lawfully appointed deputies of such officers or authorized state investigators in counties of
400,000 persons or more are not entitled to serve any

78-27a-3

forms of civil or criminal process other than complaints, summonses, and subpoenas.
1983
78-27-59. Immunity for transient shelters.
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter"
means any person which provides shelter, food, clothing, or other products or services without consideration to indigent persons.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient shelters, owners, operators, and employees of
transient shelters, and persons who contribute products or services to transient shelters, are immune
from suit for damages or injuries arising out of or
related to the damaged or injured person's use of the
products or services provided by the transient shelter.
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against
a person for damages or injury intentionally caused
by that person or resulting from his gross negligence.
1986

CHAPTER 27a
SMALL BUSINESS EQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE ACT
Section
78-27a--1.
78-27a-2
-2.
78-27a--3.
78-27a--4.
78-27a-5.
78-27a-6.

Short title.
Legislative findings — Purpose.
Definitions.
Litigation expense award authorized in
actions by state.
Litigation expense award authorized in
appeals from administrative decisions.
Payment of expenses awarded — Statement required in agency's budget.

78-27a-l. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act."
1983
78-27a-2. Legislative findings — Purpose.
The Legislature finds that small businesses may be
deterred from seeking review of or defending against
substantially unjustified governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights. The purpose of this act is to entitle small businesses, under conditions set forth in this
act, to recover reasonable litigation expenses.
1983
78-27a-3. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final
judgment, the right to all appeals having been
exhausted, on the merits, on substantially all
counts or charges in the action and with respect
to the most significant issue or set of issues presented, but does not include the settlement of any
action, either by stipulation, consent decree or
otherwise, whether or not settlement occurs before or after any hearing or trial.
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means
court costs, administrative hearing costs, attorney's fees, and witness fees of all necessary witnesses, not in excess of $10,000, which a court
finds were reasonably incurred in opposing action covered under this act.
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or
business entity, including a sole proprietorship,
which does not have more than 250 employees,
but does not include an entity which is a subsidiary or affiliate of another entity which is not a
small business.
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elected to perform a judicial or ministerial service.
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an action or special proceeding.
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order
or process of the court.
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or
counselor of a court, and acting as such without
authority.
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process
of such court.
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to
an action while going to, remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the
calendar for trial.
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the
process or proceedings of a court.
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served,
or refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness.
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve as such, or improperly
conversing with a party to an action to be tried at
such court, or with any other person, concerning
the merits of such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person in respect
to it, without immediately disclosing the same to
the court.
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal,
magistrate or officer of the lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding
in an action or special proceeding contrary to
law, after such action or special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the
lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also
a contempt of the authority of such officer. 1953
78-32-2. Re-entry after eviction from real property.
Every person dispossessed of, or ejected from or out
of, any real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, who, not having a
right so to do, re-enters into or upon, or takes possession of, any such real property, or induces or procures
any person, not having the right so to do, or aids or
abets him therein, is guilty of a contempt of the court
by which such judgment was rendered, or from which
such process issued. Upon a conviction for such contempt the court must immediately issue an alias process, directed to the proper officer, requiring him to
restore such possession to the party entitled thereto
under the original judgment or process.
1953
78-32-3.

In immediate presence of court; summary action — Without immediate
presence; procedure.
When a contempt is committed in the immediate
view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers,
it may be punished summarily, for which an order
must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such
immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt,
and that he be punished as prescribed in Section
78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed
in the immediate view and presence of the court or
judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to
the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or
arbitrators or other judicial officers.
1953

78-32-11

78-32-4.

Warrant of attachment or commitment
order to s h o w cause.
When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge a warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person
charged to answer, or, without a previous arrest, a
warrant of commitment may, upon notice, or upon an
order to show cause, be granted; and no warrant of
commitment can be issued without such previous attachment to answer, or such notice or order to show
cause.
lass
78-32-5. Bail.
Whenever a warrant of attachment is issued pursuant to this chapter, the court or judge must direct, by
an endorsement on such warrant, that the person
charged may be [let] to bail for his appearance, in an
amount prescribed in such endorsement.
1953
78-32-6. Duty of sheriff.
Upon executing the warrant of attachment the
sheriff must keep the person in custody, bring him
before the court or judge and detain him until an
order is made in the premises, unless the person arrested entitles himself to be discharged as provided in
the next section [Section 78-32-7].
1953
78-32-7. Bail bond — Form.
When a direction to let the person arrested to bail
is contained in the warrant of attachment or endorsed
thereon, he must be discharged from the arrest upon
executing and delivering to the officer, at any time
before the return day of the warrant, a written undertaking, with two sufficient sureties, to the effect that
the person arrested will appear on the return of the
warrant, and abide the order of the court or judge
thereon, or that the sureties will pay as may be directed the sum specified in the warrant.
1953
78-32-8. Officer's return.
The officer must return the warrant of arrest, and
the undertaking, if any, received from the person arrested, by the return day specified therein.
1953
78-32-9. Hearing.
When the person arrested.has been brought up or
has appeared the court or judge must proceed to investigate the charge, and must hear any answer
which the person arrested may make to the same, and
may examine witnesses for or against him; for which
an adjournment may be had from time to time, if
necessary.
1953
78-32-10. Contempt — Action b y c o u r t
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court
shall determine whether the person proceeded
against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the court
finds the person is guilty of the contempt, the court
may impose a fine not exceeding $200, order the person imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding 30
days, or order both fine and imprisonment. However,
a justice court judge or court commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not to exceed $100 or by
imprisonment for one day, or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
1990
78-32-11. D a m a g e s to party aggrieved.
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or
special proceeding, prejudicial to his rights therein, is
caused by the contempt, the court, in addition to the
fine or imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in
place thereof, may order the person proceeded against
to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient
to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and ex-

Rule 4-503

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting and requesting jury instructions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and Justice Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented to the court five days
prior to the scheduled trial date unless otherwise ordered by the court. The
court, in its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury instructions at any
time prior to the submission of the case to the jury. At the time of presentation
to the court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be furnished to opposing counsel.
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing and state in full the instruction requested. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the
original and copies of which shall be free from red lines and firm names and
shall be entitled:
"Instruction No.

"

The number of the request shall be written in lead pencil.
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested instruction, at least
one copy of the requested instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted
without the citations. Citations may be provided upon separate sheets attached to the particular instruction to which the citation applies.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment added Justice Courts to the scope of applicability of this rule and substituted "five"

for "10" in the first sentence and added the
second sentence in Subdivision (1).

Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small
claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless
908
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Rule 4-505

the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court
and counsel within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement
and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or
decree is made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the
social security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was
made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court,
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to writing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "except small claims" under "Applicability" and
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement
of the Rule.

The 1990 amendment added the final sentence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not
of record" following "courts of record" in the
Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivision (10).

Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support
of attorneys , fees.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts.
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054
Attorney at Law
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-4703
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD D. COLEY,

]

Plaintiff,
vs.

i Case No. D 81 5126

NANCY P. COLEY,
Defendant.

i Judge James S. Sawaya

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Re: Amended Order on Order to Show Cause)
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m..
Defendant appeared in person with her attorney of record,
Randall J. Holmgren.
Plaintiff appeared in person with his attorney of record, John
R. Bucher.
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion,
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in

Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the
Plaintifffs Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its
Order on or about July 13, 1990.

On appeal, the Utah Court of

Appeals, in considering Plaintifffs Motion to Stay certain aspects
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings
of

fact

supportive

of

the

Order

denying

child-visitation.

Consistent with the directive of the Court of Appeals, this Court
does now make, adopt and find the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That these findings are based upon the evidence presented

at two hearings September 1988 and June 1990.

The Court has

further considered all of the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda
on file herein and has considered the attitude and demeanor of the
Plaintiff as the Court has observed it on numerous occasions in
court proceedings pertaining to this matter.
2.

That Plaintiff is in arrears in his child support,

including interest, in the amount of $27,305.00.
3.

That nothing has changed since the Court previously

(i.e., September

1988) found that Defendant had the present

capability to earn money to pay child support and, if anything, it
is more grievous than it was before.

4.

That Plaintiff made a $400 payment in November 1988 and

a $100 payment in December 1988 but has not made any payments since
those dates.
5.

That the aforesaid payments were made at a time when the

Court had sentenced Plaintiff to jail for contempt for not making
child support payments but also during a time period when the
sentence was stayed

for the purpose

of giving

Plaintiff

an

opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Therefore, since the
$500 in payments were made under such circumstances, and since no
payments were made during the 15-16 months (approx.) since that
time, and since no payments were made during the 3-4 years prior
to that time, the Court finds that Plaintiff's only motivation in
making the $500 in payments was to avoid going to jail and that he
was not motivated out of an interest in his daughter's welfare.
6.

That Plaintiff has the capability to earn money to pay

child support.
7.

That Plaintiff is articulate and intelligent and well-

educated.

His prior work experience includes being a licensed

real-estate broker and doing private investigatory work for local
attorneys.
8.

That Plaintiff maintains a reasonable lifestyle. He has

a residence which he rents.

The residence is furnished with

furniture and other furnishings.

He has power and heat in his

residence.

The Court has observed his manner of dress and he

dresses reasonably well.
9.

That Plaintiff has purchased material goods for his

daughter (i.e., ski equipment, ski-lift tickets, etc.) so, at least
at times, his income has been sufficient to indulge his daughter
in such sports and/or luxuries and yet during such times he has not
paid child support.
10.

That Plaintiff has earned money during the periods of

time that he has not paid child support.
11.

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintifffs failure to pay child support has been willful.
12.

Because the

failure to pay child

support has been

willful, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not, in part, respect
the legal system or the law requiring payment of child support.
For that reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs attitudes and
behaviors are anti-social and constitute a substantial deviation
from the moral norms of society.

A parent influences a child for

good or bad; some of that influence comes from the child's
observations of the parent's behavior.

For these reasons, the

Court finds that Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes, with respect
to not paying child support, are not a proper example for his child
and

that

until

Plaintiff

adopts

an

attitude,

manifest

by

appropriate behavior, that he respects the legal system and intends
to conform with the laws of this State and the directives of the

Court, he should not have personal contact with his daughter.

In

that regard, the Court finds that in the event that the Plaintiff
pays his ongoing child support in the amount of $250 per month, and
makes a monthly reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the
judgments (child support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes
both payments every month for a period of four (4) consecutive
months, he may thereby reinstate his visitation rights with his
daughter.

As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court finds:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
stated

The Plaintiff's conduct, in not paying child support, as
in

the

aforesaid

Findings

of

Fact,

is

willful

and

contumacious within the meaning of Rohr v. Rohrr 709 P.2d 382 (Utah
1985).

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court

concludes that it is not in the best interest of the minor child
to have visitation with the Plaintiff until such time as Plaintiff
shows to this Court that he is concerned

about the child's

financial support and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing
child support in the amount of $250 per month and making a monthly
reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the judgments (child
support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every

month for a period of four (4) consecutive months.

The Court

believes that if the Plaintiff makes a serious effort to support
his child financially and sustains that effort over a period of
time, he will thereby demonstrate rehabilitation of the attitude
and behavior defects, identified above, that led this Court to deny
Plaintiff visitation and contact with the minor child.

If

Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, without making
a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court shall, without
further hearing, suspend visitation.

DATED this Jj_ day of J/V f^ -

19^^.
BY THE COURT:
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RANDALL J. HOLMGREN, #4054
Attorney at Law
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-4703
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD D. COLEY,

;

Plaintiff,
vs.

i Case No. D 81 5126

NANCY P. COLEY,
Defendant.

Judge James S. Sawaya

FINDINGS OP PACT AND CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
(Re: Amended order on Order to Show Cause)
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 21, 1990 at 2:00 p.m. and was
subsequently continued to June 18, 1990 at the hour of 2:00 p.m..
Defendant appeared in person with her attorney of record,
Randall J. Holmgren.
Plaintiff appeared in person with his attorney of record, John
R. Bucher.
The Court having reviewed the file, the Defendant's Motion,
supporting Memorandum and Affidavit and the Plaintiff's Brief in

Opposition thereto, and the Defendant's Brief in Response to the
Plaintiff's Opposing Brief, and being fully advised, entered its
Order on or about July 13, 1990,

On appeal, the Utah Court of

Appeals, in considering Plaintiff's Motion to Stay certain aspects
of the Order, vacated the provisions of the Order dealing with the
denial of child-visitation privileges and remanded the matter to
the District Court, Judge James S. Sawaya, for entry of findings
of

fact

supportive

of

the

Order

denying

child-visitation.

Consistent with the directive of the Court of Appeals, this Court
does now make, adopt and find the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That these findings are based upon the evidence presented

at two hearings September 1988 and June 1990.

The Court has

further considered all of the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda
on file herein and has considered the attitude and demeanor of the
Plaintiff as the Court has observed it on numerous occasions in
court proceedings pertaining to this matter.
2.

That Plaintiff

is in arrears

in his child support,

including interest, in the amount of $27,305.00.
3.

That nothing has changed since the Court previously

(i.e., September

1988)

found

that

Defendant

had

the present

capability to earn money to pay child support and, if anything, it
is more grievous than it was before.

4.

That Plaintiff made a $400 payment in November 1988 and

a $100 payment in December 1988 but has not made any payments since
those dates.
5.

That the aforesaid payments were made at a time when the

Court had sentenced Plaintiff to jail for contempt for not making
child support payments but also during a time period when the
sentence was stayed

for the purpose

of giving

Plaintiff

an

opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Therefore, since the
$500 in payments were made under such circumstances, and since no
payments were made during the 15-16 months (approx.) since that
time, and since no payments were made during the 3-4 years prior
to that time, the Court finds that Plaintiff's only motivation in
making the $500 in payments was to avoid going to jail and that he
was not motivated out of an interest in his daughter's welfare.
6.

That Plaintiff has the capability to earn money to pay

child support.
7.

That Plaintiff is articulate and intelligent and well-

educated.

His prior work experience includes being a licensed

real-estate broker and doing private investigatory work for local
attorneys.
8.

That Plaintiff maintains a reasonable lifestyle. He has

a residence which he rents.

The residence is furnished with

furniture and other furnishings.

He has power and heat in his

residence.

The Court has observed his manner of dress and he

dresses reasonably well,
9.

That Plaintiff has purchased material goods for his

daughter (i.e., ski equipment, ski-lift tickets, etc.) so, at least
at times, his income has been sufficient to indulge his daughter
in such sports and/or luxuries and yet during such times he has not
paid child support.
10.

That Plaintiff has earned money during the periods of

time that he has not paid child support.
11.

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Court

finds

that

Plaintiff's failure to pay child support has been willful.
12.

Because the

failure to pay

child

support has been

willful, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not, in part, respect
the legal system or the law requiring payment of child support.
For that reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff's attitudes and
behaviors are anti-social and constitute a substantial deviation
from the moral norms of society.

A parent influences a child for

good or bad; some of that influence comes from the child's
observations of the parent's behavior.

For these reasons, the

Court finds that Plaintiff's behaviors and attitudes, with respect
to not paying child support, are not a proper example for his child
and

that

until

Plaintiff

adopts

an

attitude,

manifest

by

appropriate behavior, that he respects the legal system and intends
to conform with the laws of this State and the directives of the

Court, he should not have personal contact with his daughter.

In

that regard, the Court finds that in the event that the Plaintiff
pays his ongoing child support in the amount of $250 per month, and
makes a monthly reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the
judgments (child support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes
both payments every month for a period of four (4) consecutive
months, he may thereby reinstate his visitation rights with his
daughter.

As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court finds:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
stated

The Plaintiff's conduct, in not paying child support, as
in

the

aforesaid

Findings

of

Fact,

is

willful

and

contumacious within the meaning of Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah
1985).

Based

on the foregoing

Findings of Fact, the Court

concludes that it is not in the best interest of the minor child
to have visitation with the Plaintiff until such time as Plaintiff
shows to this Court that he

is concerned

about the child's

financial support and expresses that concern by paying his ongoing
child support in the amount of $250 per month and making a monthly
reduction of $200 toward the reduction of the judgments (child
support, interest, and attorney fees) and makes both payments every

month for a period of four (4) consecutive months.

The Court

believes that if the Plaintiff makes a serious effort to support
his child financially and sustains that effort over a period of
time, he will thereby demonstrate rehabilitation of the attitude
and behavior defects, identified above, that led this Court to deny
Plaintiff visitation and contact with the minor child.

If

Plaintiff thereafter fails to make such payments, without making
a clear showing of changed circumstances, the Court shall, without
further hearing, suspend visitation.

DATED this

// day of
BY THE COURT:

EXHIBIT
Coley v. Coley
Mr. Coley's Payments ($50/Week) Since 7/16/90 Order

DUE DATE

AMOUNT DUE

AMOUNT PAID

DATE PAID

JUL 23
JUL 30

50.00
50.00

.00
-40.00

AUG 6
AUG 13
AUG 20
AUG 27

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
-100.00
.00
.00

AUG 13

SEP 3
SEP 10
SEP 17
SEP 24

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
-100.00
-50.00
.00

SEP 10
SEP 17

OCT 1
OCT 8
OCT 15
OCT 22
OCT 29

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
-150.00
.00
.00
.00

NOV 5
NOV 12
NOV 19
NOV 26

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
.00
.00
-100.00

DEC 3
DEC 10
DEC 17
DEC 24
DEC 31

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
-460.00
.00
.00
.00

JAN 07
JAN 14
JAN 21
JAN 28

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

-150.00
.00
-100.00
.00

FEB 04
FEB 11
FEB 18
FEB 25

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
-150.00
.00
.00

JUL 26

OCT 11

NOV 26
DEC 10

JAN 03
JAN 22

BALANCE DUE
50.00
60.00
110.00
60.00
110.00
160.00
210.00
160.00
160.00
210.00
260.00
160.00
210.00
260.00
310.00
360.00
410.00
460.00
410.00
460.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
100.00
150.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
100.00
150.00
200.00

MAR 04
MAR 11
MAR 18
MAR 25

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
.00
.00
.00

250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00

APR 01
APR 08
APR 15
APR 22
APR 29

50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
-450.00
.00
.00
.00

450.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00

MAY 06
MAY 13
MAY 20
MAY 27

50.00
50.00
50.00

.00
.00
.00

APR 12

250.00
300.00
350.00

